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The paper is an evaluation of EU regional policy. We evaluate the institutions related to regional 
development in the EU-15 with the help of those guiding principles established by the EU to 
guarantee the most effective realisation of the common regional policy. Those principles are 
decentralisation, additionality, programming, partnership, efficiency (absorption capacity), and 
transparency. The study draws a clear picture of the northern - southern differences among the 
European countries. Nordic countries (together with The Netherlands) consistently show the best 
results. They are socially richer, seem more equal, enjoy lower levels of corruption, good 
governance and a high quality of democracy. 
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In order to evaluate the institutions related to regional development in the EU-15, we must find 
appropriate criteria for judgement. The best choice would be those guiding principles established 
by the EU
78
 to guarantee the most effective realisation of the common regional policy. To 
complement this it would be a good idea to examine the effects of Europeanization, which also 
indicate the adaptation to changes. 
An examination of decentralisation shows that the more space a country allows for its provinces 
(see federalised states), or regions (regionalised, decentralised states), the less it has to struggle 
with problems caused by regional differences. This is illustrated by Fig. 1, which shows changes 
in regional variation as a function of types of state. The so-called unitary, or strong central 
government member states, are much less able to deal successfully with differences within 
countries (Horváth 2004). 
An important precondition of the efficient use of supports is that the transfers help the growth of 
private investment rather than crowding it out. If we consider capital investment made by 
regional and local authorities as a proportion of total government investment (Fig. 2.), then we 
can also see that Greece has the most centralised system, while in Belgium 80-90% of 
investments are coordinated at a regional or local level. The basic principle of additionality, as 
described in the case of programmes supported in the Objective 1. framework, is that member 
states agree with Brussels beforehand on the level of nationally provided common finance, which 
in general should not be lower than that achieved in the period preceding the supports. The 
external examinations carried out after the 1994-99 and the 2000-2006 periods showed that this 
was not achieved everywhere (EC 2004:100). The performance of The Netherlands and Sweden 
was, however, outstanding. Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) however, show that there is 
clear evidence from the supports directed to the processing industry that a higher level of EU 
support is accompanied by lower state support, while a lower level attracts a higher level of state 
support.  
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 These are decentralisation, additionality, programming, partnership, efficiency (absorption capacity), 
transparency. 
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Fig. 1.: Changes in regional differences between most and least developed regions 
 
 
 
         Source: Horváth (2004) 
 
Fig. 2.: Capital expenditure by regional and local authorities (1995-2004) 
 
           Source: EC (2007:147) 
 
In the analysis of the following basic principles the informal institutional system of the member 
states is compared with various indicators of regional policy. These include the effectiveness of 
programming and the absorption capacity which can be measured against the quality of state 
regulation according to the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Index
79
. These indicators 
show very well the advantage enjoyed by Scandinavian nations over Mediterranean nations; the 
highest values are found in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Holland, while the list is closed by 
Italy and Greece. Other studies (eg. Van de Walle 2005) comes to the same conclusions. Limiting 
their examination to the institutions of the social systems Bakács and Borkó (2006) establish a 
ranking for the competitiveness of the Scandinavian and Mediterranean models, compared to the 
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 This index gives a numerical value for bureaucratic expertise and the quality of public services, based on 
data collected from 30 separate databases by the Worldwide Governance Indicators project. 
105 
Continental and Anglo-Saxon models, and here the Scandinavian model is first and the 
Mediterranean model last (for the bureaucracy and the political clientism of the southern states 
see Sotiropoulos 2004). 
According to the concept of partnership expressed in the EU’s decrees, one of the keys to the 
efficient and transparent use of supports is that during the planning stage the interests of local, 
regional, sectoral and social groups should be taken into account to the maximum extent, because 
on this basis the various actors will be able to claim and use the sources available. In the context 
of the principle of partnership in the process of social agreement an important role is also played 
by communication and by the publication of the details of the structural funds. 
The question arises, however, whether the relationships are built on the basis on the Putnam style 
mutual offers of help and mutually shared information, or whether the groupings are formed in 
the Olson style, based on bonds formed to represent group interests, rent-seeking behaviour and 
lobby interests. From this perspective we can also examine the general levels of social trust and 
the corruption indexes in the old EU member states. In the LSE PS’s (2007) study on social 
capital a ranking was established with Scandinavian-Mediterranean poles at each end of the scale 
(Fig. 3.), to show the results obtained from the Special Eurobarometer questionnaire. The results 
are similar as mentioned above. 
 
Fig. 3.: Generalised (social) trust in international comparison 
 
                            Source: LSE PS (2007:14) 
 
The appearance of corruption can also be compared using the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicator which examines to what extent the public sector uses its power to achieve 
personal ends, and here the higher values represent the cleaner, less corrupt countries (Fig. 4.). 
Finally, we demonstrate the negative relationship between the inequality within countries and the 
level of trust between individuals, (Fig. 5.), where, once again, the Scandinavian communities 
stand out. 
As we can see, Nordic countries (together with The Netherlands) consistently show the best 
results. They are socially richer, seem more equal, enjoy lower levels of corruption, good 
governance and a high quality of democracy. 
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Fig. 4.: Levels of corruption in different models (2005) 
 
Note: 10 – no corruption, 0 – high corruption; so the lower the index value the higher the level of 
corruption. Source: Bakács – Borkó (2006:17) on the basis of the Transparency International CPI 
(Corruption Perception Indices). 
 
Fig. 5.: Trust and inequality 
 
 
 Source: LSE PS (2007:76) 
 
The question arises whether the high level of social capital generally produces these positive 
factors and thus the more efficient use of supports, or whether the Scandinavians only appear as 
Gini index (index of inequality) 
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exceptions , which means that a high level of social capital is so closely linked to Nordic culture 
that it cannot be copied and repeated elsewhere. The question then, is whether there exists a 
Nordic model which can be copied as good practice, or whether this phenomenon is linked to 
Nordic culture, which is historically determined and thus is unlikely to be easily transferred to 
others. 
It is difficult to deny the more pessimistic version. According to Putnam et al (2003) social 
capital changes relatively slowly and it is difficult to change it with concrete political measures, 
although attempts have been made (see TÁRKI 2005). On the other hand, by examining culture 
we can arrive at an understanding of the present state of institutions, and of the practical activities 
carried out and it is evident that here too changes are occurring; it is enough to refer here to the 
processes and changes of Europeanization in the new member states. From this perspective it 
seems that at least something can be learned from the Nordic experience, for example, how the 
links between the civil sphere and the state are institutionalised and how they take shape in 
concrete development tasks to maximise the effects of good government; and how society takes 
part in the day to day business of formulating special policy and government. 
In any case it is necessary to conduct a deeper analysis into how is it possible that those who are 
the least needy can use the development funds most efficiently, while those who are in real need 
do not fulfil the preconditions for efficiency. 
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